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Much work has recently been devoted to the study of optimal ￿scal policy in environments
where the government cannot commit to future policy actions. To this point, and without
exception, this literature has abstracted either from government debt, capital, or both, and a
working assumption at the outset is that the solutions with and without commitment do not
coincide. In contrast, we show that once private capital and government debt are simultaneously
allowed in a representative agent framework, the assumed time inconsistency of Ramsey optimal
tax rates is unfounded. More speci￿cally, we show that the high initial capital levy and zero
steady state tax on capital that emerge as optimal with full government commitment also
emerge as a time consistent Markov perfect equilibrium. Furthermore, this result holds either
in ￿nite or in￿nite horizon, and irrespective of whether the time path of government spending is
determined exogenously or endogenously within the model. Finally, we discuss departures from
the conventional framework that reintroduce time inconsistency as a policy concern, despite the
coexistence of private capital and government debt.
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11 Introduction
Beginning with the work of Kydland and Prescott (1977, 1980), and Fisher (1980), optimal ￿scal
policy has come to be widely regarded as time inconsistent. In particular, their work showed
that the optimal sequence of taxes depends importantly on whether the government can commit
to its policies once and for all at the beginning of time. Thus, much work since then has been
devoted to the study of optimal policies that do not require the government to promise a course
of actions in the initial period. Some of this work uses the loss of good reputation as a way of
committing the government to desirable polices (Benhabib and Rustichini, 1997; Chari and Kehoe,
1993). Another line of work, as exempli￿ed by (Klein, Krusell, and Rios-Rull 2004; Azzimonti,
Sarte and Soares, 2003; Krusell, 2002; Xie, 1997), has relied on Markov perfect equilibria whereby
policies are constrained to be functions of the current state of the economy. Without exception, the
existing literature on optimal time consistent ￿scal policy has abstracted from either government
debt, capital, or both, and a working assumption at the outset is that the solutions with and
without commitment di⁄er. This paper shows that when both private capital and government
debt are simultaneously allowed in a representative agent framework, and factor taxes are linear,
the optimal policies with and without commitment coincide. Moreover, time consistent policies
throughout our analysis are Markov-perfect and, therefore, do not rely on intricate reputational
mechanisms.
Following the work of Judd (1985), and Chamley (1986), it is well known that in a representative
agent setting with both capital and government debt, as well as distortional taxes on capital and
labor, the optimal choice of taxes with full commitment involves an initial capital levy and a zero
tax on capital in the long run. Thus, a benevolent government that can credibly commit to future
policies takes advantage of the inelasticity of capital in the initial period with the promise never to
do so in the future. It is generally acknowledged that the government￿ s ability to commit not to
break past promises is crucial in generating this result. For instance, in the context of precisely the
Ramsey problem studied by Chamley (1986), Sargent and Ljungqvist (2000, chapter 12) write that
￿(...) taxing the capital stock at time 0 amounts to lump-sum taxation and therefore disposes of
distortionary taxation. It follows that a government without a commitment technology would be
tempted in future periods to renege on its promises and levy a con￿scatory tax on capital.￿ Thus,
starting at the Ramsey steady state, a government that re-optimizes with respect to taxes might
decide to break its earlier promise of zero capital taxes and, once again, take advantage of the sunk
2nature of past investments. This conjecture turns out to be incorrect.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, we argue that sovereign debt generally helps make Ramsey
taxes time consistent. In the environment studied by Chamley (1986), for instance, the presence
of bonds lets the government frontload all taxes in the initial period while still allowing households
to meet their desired consumption path through sovereign lending in future periods. Using the
proceeds from the lump sum tax, the government can then build up enough of an asset base at
time 0 and credibly promise never having to set positive taxes in the future. Speci￿cally, we show
that in this setting, Ramsey tax rates arise even when optimal policy is chosen sequentially by
di⁄erent governments (i.e. without commitment). We further argue that whether the time path of
government spending is exogenously given or determined endogenously within the model does not
matter for this result. In other words, the justi￿cation for a given sequence of public spending and
the means of ￿nancing it can be studied separately.
Given the lump sum nature of optimal taxes with commitment (i.e. Ramsey taxes), existing
work on optimal ￿scal policy often places a restriction on the initial capital tax rate in order to
restore a role for distortional taxes (Atkenson, Chari and Kehoe, 1999; Chai and Kehoe, 1999; Chari,
Christiano and Kehoe, 1994; Jones, Manuelli and Rossi, 1993; Jones, Manuelli and Rossi, 1997).
As we have just argued, absent this restriction, the government can potentially raise all necessary
revenues through the initial tax on capital, lend the proceeds to households, and ￿nance public
expenditures over time using households￿interest payments on the loan. Our analysis suggests
that placing a restriction on the optimal initial capital tax arbitrarily discards a policy which,
if implemented, no subsequent government would ever abandon. Thus, we discuss alternative
environments that reintroduce a role for time inconsistent distortional taxes despite the coexistence
of private capital and government debt.
Since the presence of capital and government debt can imply a rather extreme but time con-
sistent tax scheme, it is natural to question the exact assumptions that underlie this result. In
particular, we argue that having a representative household, whose lifespan is also that of the envi-
ronment, is essential in establishing the time consistency of the initial capital levy. In a world with
overlapping generations, this result breaks down as the current old, whom the government has the
incentive to tax heavily because of their inelastic capital position, may not be alive to borrow from
the government in subsequent periods to make up for the large initial tax. Taking this feature into
account, a planner will not place the entire tax burden associated with the present value of public
expenditures on the initial old generation. This fact immediately implies a role for distortional
3taxes as future generations must bear some of the tax burden associated with public expenditures.
Furthermore, a government that is allowed to re-optimize at some date faces a non-trivial choice of
how to set taxes across generations and, in particular, will always have an incentive to exploit the
fact that for the old generation at that date, the capital stock is ￿xed. Therefore, in a world where
individuals have ￿nite lives, optimal taxes with commitment will be time inconsistent.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a two-period version of the economy
studied by Chamley (1986) as a benchmark and analyzes optimal taxation under no commitment.
Section 3 shows how the results extend to the in￿nite horizon, while Section 4 provides alternative
environments where time inconsistency may arise. Section 5 concludes.
2 Optimal time consistent ￿scal policy in a two-period economy
This section shows that in a two-period version of the economy studied by Chamley (1986), the
optimal Markov perfect path for taxes involves a capital levy in the initial period and zero capital
tax rates thereafter, as well as zero taxes on labor at both dates. The two-period case is the
environment in which one can perhaps most easily establish the coincidence of full commitment and
time consistent optimal ￿scal policies. This result easily generalizes to the case with an arbitrarily
￿nite horizon. More generally, the fact that full commitment and discretionary policies coincide
does not rely on any peculiarity associated with an in￿nite horizon. That said, we show in the next
section that our main result continues to hold as the horizon becomes unbounded.
2.1 The environment
There exists a representative household who has ￿nite life indexed by t = 0;1. This household
lives in a single good economy and values consumption and leisure streams, fct;ltg1
t=0, according




lt = 1 ￿ nt, where nt denotes labor input. The function u is increasing, concave and C2 in both
arguments. The unique good is produced by combining labor and capital, kt, using the production
technology
F(kt;nt); (2)
4where F is constant returns to scale with respect to its inputs. Production can be used for either
private or government consumption, or to increase the capital stock,
ct + kt+1 + gt = F(kt;nt) + (1 ￿ ￿)kt; (3)
where 0 < ￿ < 1 denotes the capital depreciation rate, and fgtg1
t=0 represents an exogenously given
sequence of public expenditures.
As in Chamley (1986), the government ￿nances its purchases using time-varying linear taxes
on labor, ￿n
t , and capital, ￿k
t. The government can also make up for any imbalance between its
revenues and expenditures by issuing one-period bonds that are perfectly substitutable with capital.
We denote the level of government debt by bt, where bt < 0 when the government lends to the public.
At each date, the government￿ s budget constraint is given by
￿k
trtkt + ￿n
t wtnt + bt+1 = gt + Rtbt; (4)
where rt and wt are the market rates of return to capital and labor, and Rt denotes the gross rate of
return on government bonds from t￿1 to t. The left and right-hand side of equation (4) represent
sources and uses of government revenue respectively.
The representative household maximizes (1) subject to the sequence of budget constraints,
ct + kt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)kt + bt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿n
t )wtnt + (1 ￿ ￿k
t)rtkt + Rtbt; (5)
from which we obtain the static equation describing households￿optimal labor-leisure choice,
ul(ct;1 ￿ nt) = uc(ct;1 ￿ nt)(1 ￿ ￿n
t )wt; (6)
the conventional Euler equation,
uc(ct;1 ￿ nt) = ￿uc(ct+1;1 ￿ nt+1)
h
(1 ￿ ￿k
t+1)rt+1 + 1 ￿ ￿
i
; (7)
and the asset arbitrage condition,
Rt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿k
t+1)rt+1 + 1 ￿ ￿: (8)
A representative ￿rm in this economy takes as given the sequence of prices, frt;wtg1
t=0, and
maximizes pro￿ts. It follows that
rt = Fk(kt;nt) and wt = Fn(kt;nt): (9)
5Given the environment we have just laid out, second-best Ramsey tax rates are found by maximizing
welfare in (1) subject to public and private sector budget constraints (4) and (5), optimal household
behavior summarized by (6), (7), and (8), as well as ￿rms￿decision rules, (9). In solving the Ramsey
problem, we imagine that the government can commit to its chosen course of actions through time.
We further assume for now that the capital stock at date 0 is large enough to ￿nance the present
discounted value of government purchases. Under these assumptions, it is well known that Ramsey
tax rates imply a capital levy in the initial period and a zero tax on capital thereafter. Optimal ￿scal
policy with full commitment also implies a zero tax on labor at all dates. Because the capital stock
at time 0 is ￿xed, this policy prescription amounts to a single initial lump sum tax and disposes
of any distortional taxes. The literature on optimal ￿scal policy, therefore, reasonably conjectures
that without a commitment technology, a government would be tempted at future dates to renege
on its promises of zero labor and capital taxes, and revert back to a con￿scatory tax on capital (see
Chari, Christiano, Kehoe [1995], Sargent and Ljungqvist [2000], and others). We show that this
is in fact not the case, and that the Ramsey prescription also emerges in a time consistent Markov
perfect equilibrium.
2.2 Markov perfect optimal tax rates
In this section, we get rid of the commitment technology implicitly assumed in the Ramsey problem.
Rational households recognize that the public sector may have an incentive to deviate from the
sequence of taxes they promise. Hence, setting taxes once and for all at time 0 results in policy
announcements that are not necessarily credible. Such announcements do not generally constitute
a subgame perfect equilibrium since, if allowed to re optimize in any period, the government will
typically choose a di⁄erent strategy. The objective of this section is to de￿ne a maximization
problem that is associated with a time consistent tax structure in equilibrium. Attaining optimal
time consistent policies has been approached by the literature in mainly one of two ways.
One approach ￿nds the set of all possible sustainable equilibria, and characterizes the problem
using reputational mechanisms that rely on trigger strategies or reversions to the worst possible
equilibrium. Under this approach, payo⁄s are easily found but the characterization of a decentral-
ized tax structure is not always feasible. In addition, reputational mechanisms are typically not
renegotiation proof. Leading work on these issues in a public ￿nance context is developed in Chari
(1990, 1993).
Alternatively, another branch of the literature has relied on the de￿nition of Subgame Perfect
6Markov Equilibria to ￿nd optimal time consistent policies. Here, the optimal policy rule is assumed
to be a function of the current states of the economy only. Policy is history independent and
reputation plays no role. The outcomes that emerge in this literature do not necessarily constitute
the best attainable subgame perfect equilibria, but nor do they involve any of the di¢ culties
associated with renegotiation proofness. In this paper, we follow this second approach.
We de￿ne a stationary Subgame Perfect Markov Equilibrium along the lines of Klein, Krusell,
and Rios Rull (2004). In particular, tax rates depend on the current states of the economy which,
in our framework, involve the level of debt and the stock of capital.
A general feature of Ramsey policies without public debt is that if a government were given
the chance to re-optimize at some date t > 0, it would choose to deviate from the policy sequence
prescribed at t = 0. The question is whether alternative optimal policies exist which, when imple-
mented, no subsequent government would ever have an incentive to abandon. To begin addressing
this question within a Markov framework, consider a sequence of successive governments, each
choosing labor and capital tax rates based on the state it inherits when taking o¢ ce. In choosing
this policy rule, each government takes as given the following government￿ s optimal choice of taxes,
given the relevant states at that date. If a policymaker can correctly infer the rule optimally used
by his successor, he may then be able to ensure that whatever government follows will not deviate
from the taxes he wishes for that date by creating the appropriate state through its choice of policy.
For this scenario to be an equilibrium, it must be the case that all policymakers actually choose
the rule anticipated by their predecessor.
In the simple two-period economy considered in this section, time consistent optimal tax rates
of the kind we have just described can most easily be found by focusing on the last period and
proceeding backwards.
Formally, the problem of the government at date 1 is
max u(c1;1 ￿ n1) (10)
subject to the government budget constraint (4), the household budget constraint (5), and the
condition describing optimal labor-leisure choice (6), all evaluated at date 1. Observe that the
Euler equation constraint (7) that determines savings is not relevant in the last period. The
reasons are twofold. First, since the world ends with date 1, households have no incentive to
save for future consumption. In particular, k2 = b2 = 0. Second, from the perspective of this
government, the capital stock, k1, is given and past investment decisions are sunk. One important
7implication is that the optimal choices of taxes, ￿k
1 and ￿n
1, depend only on the relevant states
for that date, fk1;b1g, and we denote these choices by ￿k
1(k1;b1) and ￿n
1(k1;b1). Furthermore,
we designate optimal allocations for consumption and labor that emerge from this maximization
problem as c1(k1;b1) and n1(k1;b1) respectively.
Knowing how its successor behaves, a government at date 0 can then optimally choose how to
set taxes given fk0;b0g. In doing so, this government takes fully into account the optimal behavior
followed by the date 1 government. Formally, the maximization problem is,
max u(c0;1 ￿ n0) + ￿V (k1;b1); (11)
where V (k1;b1) = u(c1(k1;b1);1￿n1(k1;b1)), subject to the government budget constraint (4), the
household budget constraint (5), and the condition describing optimal labor-leisure choice (6), all
evaluated at date 0, as well as the Euler equation constraint,
uc(c0;1 ￿ n0) ￿ ￿
h
Fk(k1;n1(k1;b1))(1 ￿ ￿k
1(k1;b1)) + 1 ￿ ￿
i
uc(c1(k1;b1);n1(k1;b1)). (12)
In this last equation, tomorrow￿ s consumption, leisure, and taxes, are explicitly written in terms
of the date 1 decision rules. By solving the backwards induction problem we have just described,
we are ensuring that each government at each date responds in the best possible way to the states
inherited from previous governments. Therefore, the solution obtained in this way will necessarily
be time consistent, and is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Optimal time consistent taxes on labor and capital are such that ￿k





Proof. See Appendix A.
One can easily show that the policy described in proposition 1 is in fact identical to the one
that emerges under the Ramsey problem. Under commitment, if initial private asset holdings are
large enough, the policy that maximizes lifetime utility involves setting a positive capital tax rate
at date 0 (which helps ￿nance the discounted sum of future public expenditures), and no distortions
to the labor decision in either period or capital taxes at date one. In principle, once date 0 has
passed, the planner in power in period one might well have incentives to deviate from this path
and set positive taxes. However, in choosing taxes today, the date 0 government is able anticipate
the incentives facing the date 1 government and manipulate its successor￿ s policy decisions. Recall
that .... Hence, the initial government chooses taxes so as to leave the period 1 government with
8equilibrium stocks of debt and capital that exactly induce it to set taxes on capital and labor
to zero. Put another way, when one allows for the presence of both capital and bonds, strategic
manipulation by the initial government helps reproduce Ramsey outcomes despite the fact that
choices are sequential and that the past cannot be undone.
The solution for the initial optimal tax on capital is given by1
￿k
0 =





where n0(k0;b0); n1(k0;b0) and k1(k0;b0) denote allocations as a function of the initial states. As
with the standard Ramsey solution, it is possible for taxes to be zero even in the initial period.
Speci￿cally, there exist combinations of initial capital stocks and debt, k0 and b0, that deliver
￿k
0 = 0.
Figure 1 below plots equation (13) as a function of initial asset holdings.2 As one might expect,
given a ￿xed value of k0; as initial public debt increase, so does the tax on capital required in order
to ￿nance a given stream of expenditures, fg0;g1g. The relationship linking ￿k
0 to private capital,
however, is non-monotonic for di⁄erent levels of debt. To see this, it is helpful to ￿rst identify the
various e⁄ects triggered by varying initial capital, k0. On the one hand, given a return to savings,
Fk(k0;n0), a large stock of capital generates high tax revenues, ￿k
0Fk(k0;n0)k0, which suggests that
a lower value of ￿k
0 may be required to meet a given sequence of public spending. On the other
hand, since the return to savings itself decreases with k0, it helps erode the tax base as the level of
capital increases and raises the equilibrium choice of ￿k
0 to maintain feasibility. In addition, since
tomorrow￿ s return to savings falls with k0 ￿because k1(k0;b0) increases with initial capital ￿the
present value of tomorrow￿ s expenditures also rises, thus requiring a larger levy in period 0. In the
end, the net e⁄ect of changes in k0 on the equilibrium value of ￿k
0 required to ￿nance expenditures
depends crucially on initial debt, which a⁄ects both date 0 and date 1 labor choices, n0(k0;b0) and
n1(k0;b0), as well as savings in the current period, k1(k0;b0). It follows, therefore, that for each
capital stock level, k0, there exists an initial debt level, b0, for which taxes of any kind never have
to be levied.
The time consistency of Ramsey equilibrium taxes does not depend on the assumption of exoge-
nous public expenditures. Consider, for instance, an economy where the government provides pure
public goods ￿such as parks, ..., or ... ￿from which households directly derive utility. Assuming































that these goods can be ￿nanced with both bonds and taxes on factor income, the environment is
then identical to the one analyzed above, except that government expenditures are now determined
endogenously. It is still the case that the optimal policy involves high capital taxes initially with
no distortions thereafter, and that this policy is time consistent. Consequently, the justi￿cation for
a given sequence of public spending and the means of ￿nancing it can be studied separately.
Proposition 2 Consider the economy described in section 2.1, but let preferences be de￿ned over
both private and public consumption, u(c;1 ￿ n;g), where.... . Then, the optimal sequence of
taxes on labor and capital under commitment are such that ￿k
0 > 0, ￿k
1 = 0, and ￿n
0 = ￿n
1 = 0.
Furthermore, this solution is time consistent.
The proof of this proposition is entirely straightforward and follows the exact reasoning de-
scribed in Appendix A, with two additional conditions that determine the optimal size of govern-
ment spending. These conditions simply equate the marginal utility derived from the consumption
of private and public goods at each date.
The fact that Ramsey taxes are time consistent also generalizes to the case of an arbitrary ￿nite
horizon, T > 0. Under government commitment, what matters is the notion that irrespective of
the time horizon, a planner never wishes to distort either the labor-leisure decision or the savings
decision. The same reasoning turns out to apply when di⁄erent governments, but with the same
10objective, make sequential decisions over time. Given that a policymaker in o¢ ce in the last period
chooses policy based on the states it receives kT and bT, the government in period T ￿ 1 chooses
taxes so as to leave its successor with exactly those states that induce it to set ￿k
T = ￿n
T = 0. This
process repeats itself backwards until the initial period. In e⁄ect, each government acts in such a
way as to provide the exact incentives needed for its successor not to introduce distortions in the
economy.
3 Optimal time consistent ￿scal policy in in￿nite horizon
Having laid out the basic intuition underlying the time consistency of Ramsey taxes when both
capital and sovereign debt coexist simultaneously, we are now in a position to show that this
intuition extends to the standard in￿nite horizon framework. The time horizon, therefore, is not
an important determinant of outcomes in this case.
Consider the economy described in section 2 but let time range over an in￿nite horizon, t =
0;1;:::;1. De￿ne the stationary Markov-perfect equilibrium policy rules,
￿n = ￿(k;b) and ￿k =  (k;b), (14)
so that at any point in time, taxes on labor and capital depend only on the payo⁄ relevant state
variables of the economy. As shown in Krusell and Kuruscu (2002), Markov-perfect solutions
potentially allow for an in￿nite number of discontinuous equilibria (i.e. where the policy rules are
discontinuous in the state variables). When they arise, however, these equilibria typically result
from assuming an in￿nite horizon. For the purpose of our analysis, we shall narrow our de￿nition
of a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium and focus only on the limit of the ￿nite horizon solution
described in the previous section. Assuming that the policy functions in (14) are di⁄erentiable, we
show that such an equilibrium can indeed be found. In this equilibrium, taxes on labor are always
zero and taxes on capital involve a single capital levy.
Given the policy rules in (14), it is useful to write down the individual maximization problem
recursively. In what follows, we denote next period￿ s value of any variable x by x0. Let k0 = H(k;b)
and b0 = B(k;b) represent households￿optimal capital and debt accumulation decision rules under
the Markov policy functions ￿ and  . In other words, given aggregate states K and B for capital








c + b0 + k0 = [(1 ￿  (K;B))r + 1 ￿ ￿]k + Rbb + (1 ￿ ￿(K;B))wn; (15)
where r = Fk(K;N), Rb0 = (1￿ (k0;b0))Fk(k0;n0)+1￿￿, w = Fn(K;N); and aggregate outcomes
are consistent with individual optimization, K = k and B = b.
In order that the Markov policies stated in (14) constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium, no
government must ever have an incentive to deviate from ￿(k;b) and  (k;b) at any time. Therefore,
in principle, one needs to consider all possible deviations from (14). As shown in ????, however,
joint deviations are never optimal and it is in fact enough to consider only one-period deviations
from the conjectured policy rules at any date. Put another way, in our framework, it is su¢ cient
to analyze the problem of a government that is allowed to ￿cheat￿in the current period by setting
tax rates ￿n 6= ￿(k;b) and ￿k 6=  (k;b), under the assumption that ￿(k;b) and  (k;b) are forever
followed in the future. Thus, taking as given household optimal behavior summarized by (5) through
(7), a government at any date that is free to set current taxes solves
max
c;n;￿k;￿n;k0;b0 u(c;1 ￿ n) + ￿W(k0;b0) (P2)
subject to
c + k0 + b0 =
h
(1 ￿ ￿k)Fk + 1 ￿ ￿
i
(k + b) + (1 ￿ ￿n)Fnn (16)
ul(c;1 ￿ n) = uc(c;1 ￿ n)(1 ￿ ￿n)Fn
uc(c;1 ￿ n) = ￿
￿￿
(1 ￿  (k0;b0))F0
k + 1 ￿ ￿
￿
uc(e c(k0;b0;H0);1 ￿ n0)
￿





k + 1 ￿ ￿
￿
k0 + F0
nn0 ￿ H(k0;b0) ￿ g0
obtains from the consolidation of household and government budget constraints under..., F0
i =
Fi(k0;n0) with i = k;n, and W(k0;b0) denotes households￿continuation value when they behave
optimally under the Markov policy rules ￿ and  . Then, in order for ￿ and   to constitute time
consistent equilibrium policy functions, it must be the case that the optimal choices of ￿n and ￿k
that solve (P2) yield precisely ￿ and   respectively. Put another way, for ￿ and   to be equilibrium
time consistent policies, it must be the case that a government that is allowed to deviate at any
date ￿nds it in its best interest not to do so and actually follow the rules prescribed by ￿ and   in
(14).
12Proposition 3 In a Markov perfect equilibrium, ￿ and   are such that 8k and b, ￿(k;b) = 0 and
 (H(k;b);B(k;b)) = 0:
Proof. See Appendix B.
There are two important dimensions to proposition 2. First, Markov perfect taxes on labor
captured by the policy function ￿n = ￿(k;b) are always zero irrespective of the state of the economy.
Second, while time consistent taxes on capital, ￿k =  (k;b), are generally not zero for arbitrary
values of k and b, it is the case that once we begin moving forward in the dynamic program (P1)
using the decision rules k0 = H(k;b) and b0 = B(k;b), the Markov perfect tax on capital is always
zero. Observe, for instance, that two periods hence in program (P1), the values of capital, k00, and
debt, b00, are simply obtained by applying the functions H and B to states fk0;b0g respectively.
Therefore, since proposition 2 holds for all values of the states k and b, it follows that  (k00;b00) = 0.
The argument, of course, holds at any stage in the household dynamic program under the policy
rules ￿ and  . The fact that  (k;b) is generally not zero for arbitrary values of k and b simply
re￿ ects the fact that taxes have to be levied at some stage to ￿nance the present discounted value
of government expenditures. However, given arbitrary states k and b, the functions H and B map
these states, as well as all following states, into a region of the asset space where   is always zero.
Analogously to the ￿nite horizon problem, the planner at any date chooses policy such that the
resulting equilibrium asset holdings inherited by its successor place him on the surface depicted in
Figure 1 where zero taxes are optimal.
Because optimal Ramsey taxes are not observed in practice, several papers in the literature
have tried to develop models that generate positive distortional taxes in equilibrium. Two types of
restrictions are typically called on to obtain this result. Lansing (19xx), Klein, Krusell and Rios Rull
(2004), and Azzimonti, Sarte and Soares (2003), impose that the government balance its budget
every period. With this restriction in place, a benevolent planner is forced to tax capital income
even in the steady state. Moreover, since the absence of bonds prohibits households from undoing
any initial capital levy in future periods, such a levy is not used by the planner in equilibrium.
Although a balanced-budget restriction is somewhat arbitrary, it is nevertheless helpful in producing
environments where one can investigate the e⁄ects of distortional taxes in equilibrium. However,
this constraint also leads to sequences of capital and labor income taxes from which the government
has incentives to deviate at each date. The other important restriction imposed in the literature on
optimal taxation involves ￿xing the initial tax on capital income at some pre-speci￿ed level. This
immediately rules out the possibility of using a full capital levy in period 0. Papers that follow this
13approach include Christiano, Chari and Kehoe (19xx), as well as Chari and Kehoe (9xx) among
others. While this modeling strategy does lead to zero taxes in the steady state (in contrast to
work that assumes a balanced budget restriction), the economy may experience greater distortions
in the short run.
In an e⁄ort to ￿nd a tax scheme that implies explicit distortions, di⁄erent authors have thus
imposed alternative restrictions that rule out the capital levy suggested by the ￿rst best solution.
However, our ￿ndings above indicate that, were this solution to be implemented, no government
would ever choose to abandon it. Put another way, the cost ￿often ignored ￿associated with
generating environments in which distortional taxes are optimal is that only time-inconsistent
solutions become feasible.
Atkinson, Chari, and Kehoe (1999) analyze a case where the after tax rate on capital is bounded
above by 1￿￿ < 1 in any period. They show that the restriction binds at most for a ￿nite number
of periods, say n > 0, after which taxes take on an intermediate value for one period and are
zero thereafter. In that world, therefore, a capital levy of sorts is not ruled out by assumption
and emerges over the ￿rst few periods. Whether this solution is time-inconsistent is an open
question. However, we conjecture that the commitment and Markov-perfect solutions coincide in
this case. The reasoning is as follows: under commitment, a Ramsey planner wishes to set the
highest feasible capital taxes that will ￿nance enough of an asset base to eliminate distortions in
the long run. Hence, he sets ￿k
t to its upper bound for n periods, after which taxes take on an
intermediate value for one period. Now, suppose that a government in period 1 were allowed to
re-optimize. Since this government takes past decisions as given, its incentive in that period is to
set a the highest possible tax on capital in an e⁄ort to increase public asset holdings. However, since
the latter was already set at its maximum possible value, it ends up reproducing the commitment
solution. Furthermore, the same logic applies to every government up to period n. Once period
n is reached, enough government assets have been accumulated that a date n government is now
in a position to implement the ￿rst best solution without violating the constraint. In e⁄ect, the
problem at that date reduces to the one analyzed in this section. Thus, this argument pushes us
to think further about situations where long-run distortional taxes arise both with and without
commitment, even in the presence of both capital and government debt.
144 Optimal distortional taxes and the time inconsistency problem:
an overlapping generations approach
In the environment studied by Chamley (1986), one of the fundamental reasons driving the time
consistency of the optimal initial capital levy relates to households￿ability to undo this burden
in future periods by borrowing from the government. In essence, the presence of bonds lets the
government frontload all taxes in the initial period in a lump sum fashion while still allowing
households to meet their desired consumption path through sovereign lending. Using the proceeds
from the lump sum tax, the government builds up enough of a public asset base at date 0 that it
can credibly promise never having to set positive taxes in the future. And indeed, we showed above
that when optimal policy is chosen sequentially by di⁄erent governments, all with the objective of
maximizing household utility, Ramsey tax rates arise.
In practice, however, the mechanism that disposes of distortional taxes breaks down simply
because individuals have ￿nite lives (among other reasons). Speci￿cally, consider a world with
overlapping generations. The current old, whom the government has an incentive to tax heavily
because of their relatively inelastic capital position (i.e. their investment decisions are largely behind
them and sunk), may simply not be alive in subsequent periods to borrow from the government
in order to compensate for such a tax. Taking this fact into account, a planner who weighs all
generations equally will not place the entire burden associated with the ￿nancing of government
expenditures on the initial old generation. Therefore, even under commitment, a role for distortional
taxes immediately emerges as the planner optimally apportions the cost of public spending across
di⁄erent generations.
More importantly, when individuals die in ￿nite time, optimal taxes under commitment will
generally be time inconsistent, thus restoring the government￿ s ability to commit to future actions
as a policy concern. In particular, because the cost of ￿nancing the present discounted value of
government expenditures cannot be raised all at once, contrary to sections 2 and 3 above, the
government can no longer credibly promise to set future taxes to zero. In fact, when optimal policy
is chosen sequentially by di⁄erent policymakers, each government in the sequence has an incentive
to exploit the fact that for the old generation under their rule, past investment decisions cannot be
undone and the capital stock is ￿xed. Therefore, one generally expects that a world with ￿nitely
lived individuals will produce time consistent optimal taxes on capital that are positive at all dates.
We can illustrate these ideas most simply by addressing the problem of optimal taxation in a two-
15period economy analogous to that in section 2, but with overlapping generations. For transparency,
this section assumes Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) preferences and Cobb-Douglas tech-
nology. Time is indexed by t = 0;1, and individuals live for two periods. The economic environment,
therefore, is populated by three types of households: those who are already old at date 0, those
who are born at date 0 and old and date 1, and those who are born at date 1. Let cyt and cot
denote the consumption of the young and old at time t respectively. Individuals are endowed with
one unit of time at birth, and use the ￿rst period of life to work and save for old age. In the second
period of life, individuals use the return on their savings to ￿nance their consumption expenditures
and pass away.




0)r0 + 1 ￿ ￿
i
a0, (17)
where a0 = b0 + k0. From the standpoint of a Ramsey planner (i.e. one who can commit to a
sequence of taxes), this generation￿ s investment decisions are sunk, in the sense that a0 is given,
which creates an incentive to set ￿k
0 > 0. However, contrary to the representative agent construct
of section 2, this generation will not be alive in the following period to make up for this tax through
borrowing.
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a1: (19)
Optimal labor and savings decisions for this generation can be summarized by
￿n￿￿













Finally, the generation born at date 1 sets a2 = 0 since the world ends on that date. Its budget
constraint is given by
cy1 = (1 ￿ ￿n
1)w1n1; (22)
16and its only relevant decision relates to optimal labor supply,
￿n￿￿
1 = (1 ￿ ￿n
1)w1c￿￿
y1 . (23)
4.1 Optimal ￿scal policy with commitment
Given a planner who weighs every generation equally, second-best Ramsey tax rates and corre-






























generation born at date 1
(P3)
subject to the sequence of government budget constraints,
g0 + [(1 ￿ ￿k
0)r0 + 1 ￿ ￿]b0 = ￿n
0w0n0 + ￿k
0r0k0 + b1; (24)
and
g1 + [(1 ￿ ￿k
1)r1 + 1 ￿ ￿]b1 = ￿n
1w1n1 + ￿k
1r1k1; (25)
agents￿budget constraints (17), (18), (19), and (22), as well as agents￿optimal labor and savings
decisions (20), (21), and (23).
Although closed form solutions for optimal taxes and corresponding allocations are not possible
in this context, the numerical example depicted in Figure 2 is helpful in making two important
points. First,.., ￿n
0, ￿n
1 6= 0. Talk about variations with respect to k0. Second, ..., ￿k
1 = 0. To be
completed.
4.2 Time consistent optimal ￿scal policy
As in section 2, time consistent optimal tax rates can be found in two stages using backward














subject to agent￿ s resource constraints (19) and (22), the equation describing the optimal labor-
leisure decision of the generation born at date 1, (23), and the period 1 government budget con-























17Given the states fk1;b1g, equations (19), (22), (23), (25), and (27), represent a set of ￿ve equations
in ￿ve unknowns, co1, cy1, n1, ￿n
1, and ￿k
1.
At date 0, the government takes as given this set of equations, which implicitly determines













+ ￿V (k1;b1), (28)






1￿￿ , subject to agents￿budget constraints
(17) and (18), optimal behavior summarized by (20) and (21), as well as the period 0 government







As stated in the text, we prove proposition 1 using backwards induction, starting with the last
period.
Optimal policy in the ￿nal period
A benevolent government in the last period is faced with states fk1;b1g, and maximizes house-
hold utility subject to the constraints (4) and (5), as well as the private sector decision rules (6),
(7), (8), and (9), as they apply to date 1. To simplify notation, we shall use at times uc(t), un(t),
Fk(t), etc... to denote time￿t values of the indicated functions, to be evaluated at their appropriate
arguments. Thus, the Lagrangian corresponding to the date 1 problem is
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1Fk(1)(k1 + b1) + ￿n
1Fn(1)n1 ￿ g1 ￿ (Fk(1) + 1 ￿ ￿)b1
i
:
The ￿rst order conditions associated with this problem are
c1 : uc(1) + ￿[ucc(1)(1 ￿ ￿n
1)Fn(1) ￿ ulc(1)] ￿ ￿ = 0; (29)
￿k
1 : ￿￿ + ￿ = 0; (30)
￿n
1 : ￿￿uc(1) ￿ ￿n1 + ￿n1 = 0; (31)
and
n1 : ￿ul(1) + ￿f(1 ￿ ￿n










1Fkn(1)(b1 + k1) + ￿n
1 [Fnn(1)n1 + Fn(1)] ￿ Fkn(1)b1
o
= 0
Given these conditions, we now solve for the decision rules, ￿n
1, ￿k
1, n1, and c1 as functions of the
states, k1 and b1: It is easiest to ￿rst establish the following result in proposition 1.
Result 1: ￿n
1 = 0
From equations (30) and (31), we have that ￿ = 0. This implies that
uc(1) = ￿ (33)
19in (29). Furthermore, given that ￿ = 0, that ￿ = ￿, and that Fkn(1)k1 + Fnn(1)n1 = 0 under the
assumption that F is constant returns to scale, equation (32) reduces to
un(1) = uc(1)Fn(1): (34)
Since equation (6) describes households￿optimal labor-leisure decision at all dates, it follows that
￿n
1 = 0, (35)
so that labor is not taxed in the ￿nal period.￿
We now turn our attention to the remaining decision rules. Using the fact that ￿n
1 = 0; we
obtain from the government budget constraint that
￿k
1 =
g1 + (Fk(1) + 1 ￿ ￿)b1
Fk(1)(k1 + b1)
; (36)




g1 + (Fk(1) + 1 ￿ ￿)b1
Fk(1)(k1 + b1)
￿
Fk(1) + 1 ￿ ￿
￿
(k1 + b1) + Fn(1)n1: (37)
This last expression yields, after some basic manipulations,
c1 = F(1) ￿ g1 + (1 ￿ ￿)k1: (38)
Therefore, we can write (34) as
un(F(k1;n1) ￿ g1 + (1 ￿ ￿)k1;1 ￿ n1) = uc (F(k1;n1) ￿ g1 + (1 ￿ ￿)k1;1 ￿ n1)Fn(k1;n1)
which de￿nes the solution for labor in the last period as a function of k1, and the exogenous variable,
g1,
n1 ￿ n1(k1): (39)
Observe that n1 is independent of the level of debt inherited in period 1. Moreover, we can then
substitute (39) in equations (36) and (38) to obtain policy functions for the capital tax rate and




c1 ￿ c1(k1); (41)
where the level of consumption, c1, in (38) is independent of b1. Equations (35), (39), (40), and
(41) are the optimal decision rules, as functions of the state, associated with the period 1 problem.
20We now turn to the optimal policy problem from the standpoint of the initial period and address
the remaining results in proposition 1.
Optimal policy in period zero
Knowing how a benevolent government behaves in the last period, so that one can anticipate
what tax rates emerge given the relevant states for that date, fk1;b1g, one can address the problem
of optimal ￿scal policy from the standpoint of date 0. The relevant Lagrangian for period 0 is
max u(c0;1 ￿ n0) + ￿
V (k1)
z }| {















0) + 1 ￿ ￿
￿
(k0 + b0) + (1 ￿ ￿n





0Fk(0)(k0 + b0) + ￿n
0Fn(0)n0 ￿ g0 ￿ (Fk(0) + 1 ￿ ￿)b0 + b1
i
;
where, for transparency, we have written solutions for date 1 variables explicitly in terms of the
date 1 states as worked out above.
The ￿rst order conditions associated with (PA2) yield
c0 : uc(0) + ￿[ucc(0)(1 ￿ ￿n
0)Fn(0) ￿ ulc(0)] + ￿ucc(0) ￿ ￿ = 0; (42)
￿k
0 : ￿￿ + ! = 0; (43)
￿n
0 : ￿￿uc(0) ￿ ￿n0 + !n0 = 0: (44)
The optimal choice of bonds to be carried into date 1 yields
b1 : ￿￿Fk(1)￿k
b(1)uc(1) ￿ ￿ + ! = 0; (45)
Observe that, since ￿ = ! in (43), (44) implies ￿ = 0 and (45) implies ￿ = 0:
The optimality condition with respect to k1 is simply
k1 : ￿ [uc(1)ck(1) ￿ ul(1)nk(1)] ￿ ￿ = 0: (46)
The optimal allocation of labor is given by










0Fkn(0)(b0 + k0) + ￿n
0 [Fnn(0)n0 + Fn(0)] ￿ Fkn(0)b0
o
= 0:
21We are now in a position to establish the following results regarding the optimal labor tax at date
0 and the optimal capital tax rate in the ￿nal period.
Result 2: ￿n
0 = 0 and ￿k
1 ￿ ￿k
1(k1;b1) = 0.
Observe that (44) implies ￿ = 0 since ￿ = ! in (43), and that equation (42) reduces to
uc(0) = ￿: (48)
Hence, the optimal allocation of labor in (47) simpli￿es to
ul(0) = uc(0)Fn(0) (49)
As before, since equation (6) holds in every period, it follows that
￿n
0 = 0; (50)
which con￿rms the ￿rst part of result 2. Moreover, note that so far, results 1 and 2 combine to
give us ￿n
0 = ￿n
1 = 0. To prove the second part of result 2, take the derivative of (38) with respect
to k1 to obtain
ck(1) = Fk(1) + Fn(1)nk(1) + (1 ￿ ￿):
Consequently, using (34), equation (46) simpli￿es to
uc(0) = ￿ [uc(1)Fk(1) + 1 ￿ ￿]: (51)
Therefore, by equation (7), it follows that
￿k
1 = 0; (52)
which establishes the second part of Result 2.￿
As in the steady state associated with the Ramsey problem, time consistent tax rates on labor
and capital are zero in the last period. It remains to ￿nd the policy functions for ￿k
0, n0, c0, k1 and
b1, given the initial levels of private capital and public debt, k0 and b0.
Given (52), equation (36) implies that
b1 =
￿g1
Fk(1) + 1 ￿ ￿
; (53)
which is to say that government purchases at date 1 are ￿nanced solely by interest payments on
loans made to the private sector in the initial period. Using the fact that ￿n
0 = 0 and the expression
for b1 above, we can re-write the government budget constraint at date 0 as
22￿k
0 =





Therefore, the size of the initial tax on capital is equal to that of the present discounted value
of public expenditures less the return on any initial assets owned by the government. Note that
ceteris paribus, ￿k
0 can be negative if the government starts o⁄ with a large enough assets.
From the household￿ s resource constraint, we have that
c0 = F(0) ￿ g0 + (1 ￿ ￿)k1 ￿ k0: (55)
Therefore, equation (51) can be re-written as
uc(F(k0;n0) ￿ g0 + (1 ￿ ￿)k0 ￿ k1;1 ￿ n0) (56)
= ￿uc(c1(k1);1 ￿ n1(k1))[Fk(k1;n1(k1)) + 1 ￿ ￿]
Observe also that equation (49) can be expressed as
ul(F(k0;n0) ￿ g0 + (1 ￿ ￿)k0 ￿ k1;1 ￿ n0) (57)
= uc(F(k0;n0) ￿ g0 + (1 ￿ ￿)k0 ￿ k1;1 ￿ n0)Fn(k0;n0)
Given the initial capital stock, k0 (and exogenous government spending g0), equations (56) and (57)
make up a system of two equations in two unknowns, n0 and k1, which de￿ne the policy functions
n0 ￿ n0(k0) (58)
and
k1 ￿ k1(k0): (59)
Finally, we can now use (58) and (59) in equations (53), (54), and (55) to formally de￿ne the
remaining policy functions b1(k0); ￿k
0(k0;b0), and c0(k0) respectively.￿
23Appendix B
The Lagrangian corresponding to problem (P2) is
max
c;n;￿k;￿n;k0;b0 u(c;1 ￿ n) + ￿W(k0;b0) (PA3)
+￿
nh
(1 ￿ ￿k)Fk + 1 ￿ ￿
i
(k + b) + (1 ￿ ￿n)Fnn ￿ k0 ￿ b0 ￿ c
o
+￿ful(c;1 ￿ n) ￿ uc(c;1 ￿ n)(1 ￿ ￿n)Fng
+￿
￿
uc(c;1 ￿ n) ￿ ￿
￿￿
(1 ￿  (k0;b0))F0
k + 1 ￿ ￿
￿











k + 1 ￿ ￿
￿
k0 + F0
nn0 ￿ H(k0;b0) ￿ g0;
denotes next period￿ s consumption under the assumption that tomorrow￿ s government abides by
the Markov policy rules ￿ and  .
Since the one period deviation considered in (PA3) is such that households behave optimally
thereafter under the Markov policy rules ￿ and  , observe from the dynamic program in (P2) that
W(k;b) = u(c(k;b);1 ￿ n(k;b)) + ￿W(k0;b0)
where
c(k;b) = [(1 ￿  (k;b))Fk + 1 ￿ ￿](k + b) + (1 ￿ ￿(k;b)Fnn ￿ H(k;b) ￿ B(k;b)
and n(k;b) solves
ul(c(k;b);1 ￿ n) = uc(c(k;b);1 ￿ n)Fn(1 ￿ ￿(k;b)):
The ￿rst order conditions associated with problem (PA3) are as follows (for notational conve-
nience, when the context is clear, we do not explicitly write uc, Fk, Fn, etc... as a function of their
arguments):
￿k : ￿￿Fk(k + b) + !Fk(k + b) = 0 (60)
) ￿ = !:
￿n : ￿￿Fnn + ￿Fnuc + !Fnn (61)
) ￿ = 0:





kuc(e c0;1 ￿ n0) +
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kuc(e c0;1 ￿ n0) +
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(1 ￿  0)F0








c : uc ￿ ￿ + ￿[ulc ￿ ucc(1 ￿ ￿n)Fn] + ￿ucc = 0 (63)
) uc + ￿ucc = ￿ since ￿ = 0:
After some manipulations, the ￿rst-order conditions with respect to n yields
n : ul = ￿Fn ￿ ucl￿: (64)
Finally, the optimality condition with respect to tomorrow￿ s capital stock reads as
￿W0















(1 ￿  0)F0








To arrive at the results stated in proposition 2, as well as to highlight some interesting properties
of the problem above, we begin by focusing on equation (62). In particular, let us conjecture for
now that H(k;b) = H(k) and Wb(k;b) = 0:In other words, we conjecture that the value function
associated with problem (PA3) is independent of the level of debt along the equilibrium path. Then,
since the expression in brackets is strictly non-zero, we have that
￿ = 0. (66)
It immediately follows that
uc = ￿ (67)
25and that
ul = ucFn (68)
from equations (63) and (64) respectively. In particular, this last equation implies that ￿n = 0
so that, in a Markov perfect equilibrium, ￿(k;b) = 0 8k and b. This establishes the ￿rst part of
proposition 2.





































from which it follows that  (k0;b0) = 0 when k0 and b0 are chosen optimally. Put another way,
 (H(k;b);B(k;b)) = 0, which establishes the second part of proposition 2.
It now remains to verify that our conjectures H(k;b) = H(k) and Wb(k;b) = 0 is actually correct
in a Markov perfect equilibrium.
Evaluating the agents￿￿rst order condition for leisure in the political equilibrium, we see that
labor is a function of capital holdings and savings (recall that g is exogenously given): n(k;k0):
ul(F(k;n) + (1 ￿ ￿)k ￿ k0 ￿ g;1 ￿ n) = uc(F(k;n) + (1 ￿ ￿)k ￿ k0 ￿ g;1 ￿ n)Fn(k;n):
Replacing n(k;k0) and into the optimality condition for savings, we realize that k0 is indeed
independent of bond holdings,
uc(F(k;n(k;k0)) + (1 ￿ ￿)k ￿ k0 ￿ g;1 ￿ n(k;k0)) = ￿
￿
Fk(k0;n(k;k0)) + 1 ￿ ￿
￿
uc(F(k0;n(k0;k00)) + (1 ￿ ￿)k ￿ k00 ￿ g;1 ￿ n(k0;k00));
since k0 = H(k) and k00 = H(H(k)) satisfy this equation.
The optimal labor choice is then, n(k;H(k)) ￿ ￿(k) and consumption equals c(k) = F(k;￿(k))+
(1￿￿)k￿H(k)￿g: Finally, the value function becomes, W(k;b) = u(c(k);1￿￿(k))+￿W(H(k)) =
W(k); which is independent of b:
26